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NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE ADOLESCENT FAMILY LIFE ACT: AN ANALYSIS OF
BOWEN V. KENDRICK AND ITS IMPACT ON CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act (A.F.L.A.) in
1981.1 The purpose of the Act is to provide funding to public or
nonprofit private organizations or agencies used in connection with
counseling and adolescent services.2 These services include counseling regarding premarital adolescent sexual relations. The Act,
because it directly funds and involves religious organizations, was
challenged by a group of federal taxpayers, clergymen and the Jewish Congress as an unconstitutional establishment of religion under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.' The
United States Supreme Court, in Bowen v. Kendrick,4 held that
such funding was not unconstitutional, affirming at least on its
face, the existence of the A.F.L.A. This Note has four objectives:
first, to examine the facts before the Court in Bowen; second, to
provide a brief survey of several significant cases in the Establishment Clause arena; third, to critique the use of the traditional
Lemon v. Kurtzman 5 analysis applied by the Bowen Court; and
1. 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
2. Id. § 300z 1(a)(7).
3. U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion ...
" Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S.
Ct. 2562, 2568 (1988).
4. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon the Supreme Court
determined that government acts many constitute an unconstitutional establishment of religion unless: one, the laws' have a secular legislative purpose; two, the
laws' principal or primary effect "must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;" and three, the legislation must not foster an "excessive entanglement
with religion."
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fourth, to analyze the implications of the Bowen holding on Establishment Clause jurisprudence.'
THE CASE

Congress passed the A.F.L.A. was passed as a calculated response to a perceived health and moral crises. 7 After considering
the alarming rate of teenage pregnancies,8 Congress concluded that
"pregnancy and childbirth, among unmarried adolescents, particularly young adolescents, often results in severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences." 9 In an attempt to deal with
these problems resulting from the adolescent pregnancy epidemic1"
Congress concluded that:
[sluch problems are best approached through a variety of integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and their
families by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations and other groups in the private
sector as well as services provided by public sponsored
initiatives."
The Adolescent Family Life Act, with this social problem in
mind, was intended to fulfill several purposes.1" Among the more
significant objectives are: "to promote self-discipline and other
6. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(1).

8. Id. § 300z(a)(5).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(1). "In 1978, an estimated one million, one hundred
thousand teenagers became pregnant, more than five hundred thousand teenagers
carried their babies to term, and over one-half of the babies to such teenagers
were born out of wedlock."
10. Id. § 300z(a)(5).
11. Id. § 300z(B).
12. The A.F.L.A.'s stated purposes include: "to find effective means, within
the context of the family, of reaching adolescents before they become sexually
active
." § 300z(B)(10); "to promote adoption as an alternative for adolescent
parents" § 300z(B)(2); "to establish innovative, comprehensive, and integrated
approaches to the delivery of care services for pregnant adolescents who are seventeen years of age or under . . ." § 300z(B)(3); "to encourage and support research projects concerning . . . the causes and consequences of adolescent premarital sexual relations . . ." § 300z(b)(4); "to support evaluative research to
identify effective services which alleviate, eliminate, or resolve any negative consequences of adolescent premarital sexual relations . . ." § 300z(b)(5); and "to encourage and provide for the dissemination of results, findings and information
from programs. . . and research projects relating to adolescent premarital sexual
relations, pregnancy and parenthood." § 300z(b)(6).
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prudent approaches to the problem of adolescent premarital sexual
relations;""3 "to promote adoption as an alternative for adolescent
parents;""' and "to establish innovative, comprehensive, and integrated approaches to the delivery of care services for pregnant
adolescents."' 5
The A.F.L.A. places limitations and conditions on grantees
who are eligible for the federal funds. Under the provisions of the
Adolescent Family Life Act, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services is authorized to ascertain whether grantees meet the Act's
requirements. 6 No award of funds may be appropriated to programs that offer only abortion services.' 7 The Act does, however,
allow abortion referral counseling by eligible grantees if the adolescent and parents or guardians involved ask for such a referral.'"
Any potential grantee that receives funds under the Act must
submit an application which requires, among other things, that the
potential grantee give a description of how the grantee will:
involve families of adolescents in a manner which will maximize the role of the family in the solution of problems relating to the parenthood or pregnancy of the adolescent;
(B) involve religious and charitableorganizations,voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as
services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives.' 9
(A)

In addition, the text of the Act contains no specific statutory restriction regarding the use of available A.F.L.A. funds in promoting religious purposes. The Act only requires that each grantee
who receives federal funds under the A.F.L.A., file periodic reports
indicating how the respective grantee is using the money.2"
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
made "only

§ 300z(b)(1).
§ 300z(b)(2).
§ 300z(b)(3).
§ 300z-10(a). "Restrictions" provision insures that appropriations are
to programs or projects which do not provide abortions or abortion

counseling or referral. ..."

17. Id. § 300z-10(a).
18. Id. § 300z-10(b). This provision states that "the Secretary shall ascertain
whether programs or projects comply with subsection (a), (i.e., § 300z-10(c), and
takes appropriate action if programs or projects do not comply with such subsection, including withholding of funds."
19. Id. § 300z-5(21)(A) and (B) (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 300z-5(c), stating "each grantee which receives funds for a demonstration project for services under this subchapter shall make such reports concerning its use of federal funds as the Secretary may require. Reports shall include, at such times as considered appropriate by the secretary, the results of the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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Bowen v. Kendrick was first heard in federal district court in
1983.21 The plaintiff challenged the A.F.L.A. on the grounds that it
was unconstitutional under the first amendment's Establishment
Clause.2 2 The district court found the A.F.L.A. to be unconstitutional, concluding that both on its face and as applied, the Act violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious organizations to participate in federally funded programs.23 The court
analyzed the A.F.L.A.'s validity in light of the test arbitrated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.2
Lemon is the seminal case in Establishment Clause analysis.
In Lemon the Supreme Court first announced and applied its current test: of whether a contested government action establishes a
religion in violation of the first amendment. Lemon involved two
appeals concerning Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes.25
Both state laws were struck down in application of the Court's new
three prong analysis. The Lemon test states that a statute raising
Establishment Clause issues will be constitutional if: first, the statute has a secular purpose; second, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, the statute does not foster
excessive entanglement between church and state.26
Using the analysis set forth in Lemon, the district court in
Kendrick v. Bowen held that the A.F.L.A. both "on its face" and
"as applied" has the primary effect of advancing religion. Thus,
the Act violated the first amendment's Establishment Clause."
First, the district court held that the Adolescent Family Life
evaluations of the services supported under this subchapter."
21. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1570.
24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Id.
26. In Lemon, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the Rhode Island
Salary Supplement Act and the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Both respective statutes were found to be unconstitutional on
excessive entanglement grounds. The parochial schools receiving the aid under
the Rhode Island statute "constituted an integral part of the religious mission of
the Catholic church." Lemon at 616. The Court noted that the significant religious nature of the schools was the type of environment that would promote excessive entanglement between church and state. The Pennsylvania statute also
fostered excessive entanglement since the state law required schools eligible for
and receiving funds to keep a separate accounting of the specific expenditures to
secular subjects taught. The effect of such a requirement created "an intimate
and continuing relationship between church and state." Lemon at 622.
27. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1560 (D.D.C. 1987).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/4
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Act "on its face" has the primary effect of advancing religion "because it funds teaching and counseling of adolescents by religious
organizations on matters related to religious doctrine."2 The district court found "a direct and immediate effect of advancing religion" from the Act's emphasis on counseling and education. The
district court held that in reality these functions amounted to the
"teaching" of the harm of pre-marital sexual relations and that
"these elements are fundamental elements of religious doctrine."29
The district court stressed in its finding that many religions have
at their core teachings concerning the immorality of pre-marital
sex. Thus, the district court viewed the Act as promoting the advancement of religious ideas in a'manner that violated the Estab30
lishment Clause.
In finding the A.F.L.A. unconstitutional, the district court
found a "crucial symbolic link" between church and state. 1 The
district court noted that link between church and state existed because religious organizations received federal funds and disbursed
them in a manner which was "inescapably infused with religious
32
beliefs."
In addition, the district court held that "as applied" the
A.F.L.A. has the primary effect of advancing religion in a manner
in which the first amendment does not allow. 3 The court noted
that several A.F.L.A. grantees were religious organizations and that
such information provided conclusive evidence that a significant
number of grantees were groups with religious affiliations.3 4 This
evidence led the district court to the inevitable conclusion that religious organizations used federal funds to espouse and teach ideas
that the court considered as inextricably bound with religion."
The district court also concluded that the A.F.L.A. fostered
excessive entanglement between church and state because the Act
28. Id. at 1562.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1563.
31. The symbolic link image was also discussed in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985). There the Supreme Court found such a link
present by the appropriation of federal funds to parochial schools. Such a practice
was seen as posing the unconstitutional risk that government funds were being
used to "inculcate particular religious tenets or beliefs." Grand Rapids, 473 U.S.
at 385.
32. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1564.
33. Id. at 1551.
34. Id. at 1564.
35. Id. at 1565.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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could be administered only by promoting a close relationship between the government and religion. After examining the factors
which the courts will utilize to identify excessive entanglement,3 6
the court found that the "nature" of the federal funding created
the potential hazard that religious organizations receiving the
funds would promote religion unless there was a significant monitoring by the government in order to insure the funds were not
used in a manner that advances religion."7
BACKGROUND

To trace the growth and development of first amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence is an ambitious task. This section provides a brief synopsis of several major Establishment
Clause cases considered by the Supreme Court and an analysis of
the contribution each case has made in the development of the
current Establishment Clause test.
The Supreme Court heard the first major Establishment
Clause case, Bradfield v. Roberts,38 in 1899. In Bradfield, a unanimous Court rejected complainant's challenge that congressional
funding to a hospital with strong religious affiliations was unconstitutional. The complainant argued that the hospital was:
a private eleemosynary corporation and that to the best of complainant's knowledge and belief it is composed of members ... of
the Roman Catholic Church, and is conducted under the auspices
of said church. . . in view of the sectarian character of [the hospital] . . .the contract between the same and the Surgeon General of the Army. . .are unauthorized by law. . . contrary to the
article of the Constitution which declares that Congress shall
make no law respecting a religious establishment.3 '
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the hospital's pervasively sectarian nature did not "change the legal character of the corporation or render it on that account a religious or
' 40
sectarian body.
In Everson v. Board of Education,"' the Supreme Court
reached what has come to be accepted as a milestone decision in
36. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688, (1971).
37. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1568.
38. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
39. Id. at 293.
40. Id. at 297.
41. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/4
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Everson Court confronted, and upheld as constitutional, a New Jersey law that allowed government-provided transportation for children to private
religious schools and authorized fare reimbursement to parents of
children attending either public or Catholic schools.4 2 In its holding, the Everson Court attempted to clarify the meaning of the Establishment Clause by stating:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs or any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa.4 3
In upholding the New Jersey bussing program, the Supreme Court
affirmed the notion that secular objectives of legislation, in this
case, bus transportation, which serve in the public's interest would
not be found unconstitutional, at least when the law is substantially within the public's interest at large, even though religious
bodies may indirectly benefit from such government acts. 4
The following year, the Supreme Court confronted the next
significant Establishment Clause case, McCollum v. Board of Education.46 In McCollum, the Court struck down a time release program in schools which allowed students to receive religious instruction for one period a week. This practice was found to offend the
barriers set by the first amendment since the program's practical
effect involved the use of public school buildings for inculcating
religious ideas to captive students. 6
In contrast, the Court in Zorach v. Clauson,'7 upheld a time
release program where the students left the public school premises
in order to receive religious training. This time release program
was found to be constitutional as distinguished from McCollum,
because in Zorach, students left public school property to receive
42. Id.
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Id. at 6.
45. 333 U.S. 203 (1947).
46. Id. at 205.
47. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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religious instruction at nearby facilities. "8 Since religious counseling was not given in the public schools the Court found no unconstitutional establishment of religion despite the fact that the public school teachers played a minor role in effectuating the time
release program. 9
The Zorach decision is most noted for Justice Douglas' opinion which advocated what is now considered with ever growing
popularity as the "accommodation doctrine." Holding that "we are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a supreme being, 115 Justice Douglas argued that it is in the country's best inter-,
est when government cooperates with religion. In Justice Douglas's
view government .does not have to hold a "callous indifference" to
religious groups in order to remain nonviolative of the Establishment Clause. 1
In Engel v. Vitale,5 s the Supreme Court struck down a state
written and sponsored school prayer in one of the most controversial of all church state decisions. The Engel Court held unconstitutional a state -law which required school principals to insure that
a state written prayer be read aloud at the start of each school
day. 5 4 The Court held the state prayer to be an establishment of
religion notwithstanding the fact that the prayer was non-denominational and that students who did not wish to participate in the
exercise could leave the classroom. 5
In Abington School District v. Schempp, 5" the Supreme Court
followed the rationale of previous Establishment Clause cases and
held a state law requiring verses to be read aloud from the Bible at
48. Id.
49. Id. at 309. Appellants had argued, that because public school teachers
"police" the time release program by maintaining an attendance sheet of students
released, that such practice involved a unconstitutional degree of government
sponsored religious activities.
50. Id. at 314.
51. Id. at 314. Douglas in his infamous "accommodation" opinion went on to
state that "we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against the efforts to
widen the effective scope of religious influence."
52. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
53. Id. at 422.
54. Id. The New York State Board of Regents had composed the prayer
which read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon thee, and we
beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country."
55. Id. at 430.
56. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/4
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the beginning of each school day to violate the first amendment.5 7
The Court pointed out its disagreement with the argument that
the religious practices were "minor" and therefore constitutional
under the first amendment. 8 The Court also refuted the assertion
that its decision had the effect of establishing a religion of secular
humanism in the public schools.5 9
The Abington decision is most significant for announcing Justice Clark's two part test to be used in determining whether the
legislation violates the Establishment Clause. In order to pass constitutional muster, the legislation must have "a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor :inhibits
religion."60 This two part test would later be incorporated into the
current Establishment Clause test.
Then Chief Justice Burger, in Walz v. Tax Commissioner,""
formulated the third prong of the presently used Lemon .test. In
Walz, a property owner sought an injunction from the New York
courts asking for a prohibition of tax exemptions given to religious
bodies for properties those groups used only for religious activities.6 2 Appellant argued this tax exemption violated the Establishment Clause since the state was directly contributing to the advancement of religion. Justice Burger cast aside any notion that
the first amendment lays out strict rules regarding the separation
of church and state. 3 He noted that there is much room in churchstate relations to promote a "benevolent neutrality" between government and religion." After concluding that tax exemptions are
in the best interest of America's heritage and are not per se considered an establishment of religion, the Court then added a third
prong to its analysis in the assurance that such practices did not
amount to "excessive entanglement between church and state."6
The Walz opinion is significant not only for its announcement
of the "excessive entanglement" analysis, but also for the Court's
57. Id. at 225.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 222.
61. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
62. Id. at 667.
63. Id. at 669.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 674. The Walz opinion is significant for its introduction of the "excessive entanglement" analysis. Such analysis would become the third prong of
the Lemon test.
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predictions of what might be considered to be a genuine secular
legislative purpose. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed the right of the
states to acknowledge the positive and contributing role religious
bodies play in our society by recognizing that such groups "foster"
[society's] "moral or mental improvement [and] should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation."6
From these cases evolved the most current analysis of the Establishment Clause articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.6 8
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN

Bowen v.

Kendrick
In Bowen v. Kendrick,69 the Supreme Court held that the
A.F.L.A. "on its face" did pass constitutional muster but remanded
for a determination of whether the A.F.L.A. "as applied" violates
the Establishment Clause.7 0 In reversing the district court's decision, the Supreme Court analyzed the A.F.L.A. applying the
Lemon analysis. 7'
A.

Secular Purpose

In its holding, the Supreme Court determined initially that
the Adolescent Family Life Act was supported by a legitimate secular purpose.7 ' The Court placed particular emphasis on the Act's
wording which itself revealed that its purpose was the "elimination
or reduction of social and economic problems caused by teenage
sexuality, pregnancy and parenthood. 7 3 The Court's opinion, au66. L. MANNING, THE LAW OF CHURCH STATE RELATIONS, 69 (West Publishing
Company, 1980).
67. Walz, 392 U.S. at 672.
68. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
69. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
70. Id.
71. The Court stated that only a small number of cases in the Establishment
Clause spectrum have made the distinction between a statute "on its face" and
"as applied." Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (1988). In Edwards v.
Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987), the Court made such a distinction, finding the
Louisiana Creationism Act to be facially invalid. Also, in both Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971), the opinions of the Supreme Court discuss the "on the face" and "as
applied" distinction.
72. The Court noted in Lemon that a statute must have a genuine secular
legislative purpose and not a purpose which is not secular in nature.
73. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2571 (1988). (The Court cited Edwards v. Aguillard,
107 S. Ct. 2573 in support of its contention that the A.F.L.A. was motivated by a

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/4
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thored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied on previous Establishment Clause cases. The Court concluded there was no evidence to
support an assertion that Congress' actual purpose in enacting the
A.F.L.A. was to promote religion. " It thus appears from the opinion that legislation, if worded correctly, can pass the Lemon test's
first hurdle with little difficulty. The Court is willing to defer to
Congress' apparent intent and find that a legitimate secular purpose, exists at least when the statute's plain language purports to
promote sincere and genuine secular purpose.
Appellees argued the A.F.L.A.'s purpose was unconstitutional
due to the Act's mandate that any grantee show how it would employ the services of religious organizations in reaching the Act's
objectives. 76 The Supreme Court followed the district court by disagreeing with these contentions and noted that religious organizations were only one of several targeted charitable organizations and
other private sector groups.7 6 Thus, the Court is hesitant to find an
impermissible purpose when a statute seeks only to include religious organizations as eligible grantees of federal funds. More importantly, the Court will not find an impermissible purpose when
that Act requires a potential grantee of federal funds to show how
that grantee will employ and involve religious organizations. 7 In
its holding, the Supreme Court affirmed the usefulness of religious
organizations in meeting desired social ends without concluding
that religion is being promoted because the objectives of a statute
happen to coincide with mainstream beliefs of several religions.7"
legitimate secular purpose).
74. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2571, at 537. The Court pointed out that it was
unwilling to conclude that the purpose of the A.F.L.A. was unconstitutional simply because some of the secular objectives in the Act correlate and coincide with
tenets of certain religious beliefs. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, (1980));
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
75. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2571. See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. -, 107
S. Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1987).
76. § 300z-5(a)(21) of the A.F.L.A. requires "a description of how the applicant will, as appropriate in the provision of services - (A) involve families of
adolescents in a manner which will maximize the role of the family in the solution
of problems relating to the parenthood or pregnancy of the adolescent; and (B)
involve religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations and other
groups in the private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored
initiatives."
77. § 300z(a)(8)(B).
78. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2572.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
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B. Primary Effect
After determining that the statute's advancement of religion
was only "incidental and remote, '7 9 the Court considered several
arguments that the A.F.L.A. violated the second prong of the
Lemon test by having the primary effect of advancing religion. The
Court's analysis in rejecting those arguments may reveal the direction the Supreme Court will take in future Establishment Clause
80
cases.
First, the Supreme Court determined that it is possible, at
least constitutionally, to promote the desired social end of sexual
morality without advancing religion."' This holding specifically refutes the rationale of the district court which found the A.F.L.A.
advanced religion simply because the Act embodied values that
many sectarian groups hold as fundamental tenets of faith. 2 The
Bowen opinion itself reveals that the current Supreme Court does
not equate morality with religion nor does the Court agree that
morality cannot be promoted without unconstitutionally involving
religion. The Court concluded that there "is nothing inherently religious" about the activities and purposes the A.F.L.A. promotes
and that religious organizations are not "uniquely qualified" to
meet the purposes of the A.F.L.A. s3
Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed two other arguments that
the Act had the effect of advancing religion. First, appellees argued
the Act advanced religion solely because the A.F.L.A. "recognized"
the use of religious organizations in meeting the statute's objectives. The Court refuted this contention after examining the role
that religious organizations were to play under the A.F.L.A.. s ' The
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2575-76.
82. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1562.
83. Id. at 538.
84. § 300z(a)(8)(B) states that the teenage pregnancy epidemic is "best approached through a variety of integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and their families by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as
services provided by publicly sponsored initiatives"; § 300z(a)(10)(C) states that
the services promoted by the government "should promote the involvement of
parents with their adolescent children, and should emphasize the provision of
support by other family members, religious and charitable groups . . ."; § 300z2(a) states that demonstration projects under the A.F.L.A. "shall use such methods as will strengthen the capacity of families to deal with sexual behavior, pregnancy or parenthood of adolescents and to make use of support systems or other
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/4
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Court held that the Act reflects only the "collective wisdom of
Congress" which concluded that the Act's desired moral and social
purposes would be efficiently brought about by including religious
organizations.8 5 The Court acknowledged the right of Congress to
solicit the aid of religious bodies to "solv[e] certain secular
problems."8 Any effect on religion from such aid will be seen as
only incidental. 7
The second argument posed by the appellee's was that the
A.F.L.A. was unconstitutional because by its nature it permits religious organizations to receive federal funds. 8 The Court noted
that the Act allows for a broad array of eligible grantees and that
such a wide spectrum of potential grantees denotes neutrality to
such an extent so as to pass constitutional scrutiny.8 9 Pointing out
that the Court has never disqualified as violative of the first
amendment any participation by religious organizations in meeting
social welfare needs, the Court drew support from a broad list of
previous cases in which religious organizations were allowed to receive federal funds.9 0 For instance, in Roemer v. Maryland Board
of Public Works, 91 the Supreme Court upheld a state law that allowed state funds to be appropriated to both state and private religious colleges.9 2 The Roemer Court noted that "religious organizations need not be quarantined from public benefits that are
neutrally available to all."9 " In Tilton v. Richardson,94 the Court
also approved of a congressional plan to pay eligible state colleges
and universities construction grants, whether the colleges were affiliated with a religious denomination or not.95
The opinion indicates that any argument against the constitutionality of direct government subsidies to religious organizations,
family members, friends, religious and charitable organizations, and voluntary associations." See also § 300-z-5(a)(21)(A).
85. See Bowen, 108 S.Ct. at 2573.
86. Id.
87. See Grand Rapids School District v. Bell, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985). The
Court quoted from the Grand Rapids opinion, noting that the text of the A.F.L.A.
was one of neutrality.
88. See Bowen, 108 S.Ct. at 2573.
89. Bowen, 108 S.Ct. at 2575.
90. Citing Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
91. Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
92. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 746.
93. Id.
94. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
95. Id. at 689.
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at least when it has not been shown that a significant number of
grantees receiving the federal funds are pervasively sectarian in nature and when the statute itself has on its face what the Court
concludes are adequate safeguards against pervasively sectarian
groups receiving direct funding, will be rejected by the current Supreme Court. 6
C. Excessive Entanglement
Chief Justice Rehnquist carefully pointed out that although
direct federal funding in particular cases to religious organizations
does not, at least on its face, violate the Establishment Clause,
such grantees must not be found to be what the Court labels a
''pervasively sectarian institution." Federal aid given to what the
Court finds as a pervasively sectarian institution will be seen as
having the unconstitutional effect of advancing religion since that
situation presents the threat that federal funds will be used directly to meet those grantee's "religious mission" and not the secular purpose of the statute.9 7 Relying on Hunt v. McNair,9 8 Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that:
[a]id normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is
so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission ... "
In Grand Rapids School District v. Bell,'0 0 the Court examined
how religion is unconstitutionally advanced when pervasively sectarian groups receive direct government funding.01° The Grand
Rapids Court held that a determination of whether a grantee of
federal subsidies is pervasively sectarian must initially begin with a
determination of the "nature" of that grantee. 10 2
After referring to this existing precedent concerning pervasively sectarian institutions, the Court concluded that " . . . nothing on the face of the A.F.L.A. indicates that a significant proportion of federal funds will be disbursed to pervasively sectarian
96. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392

U.S. 236 (1968).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at
413 U.S. 734 (1973).
Id. at 743.
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 384.

-,

101 L.Ed. 2d at 541.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/4

14

Walker: Constitutional Law - The Constitutionality of the Adolescent Fami
1989]

THE ADOLESCENT FAMILY LIFE ACT

institutions."' 10 3 The unanswered question, however, is what the
Supreme Court intends by this interpretation. It appears the Court
will not uphold, at least facially, direct federal funding to pervasively sectarian groups when it cannot be shown that more than an
insignificant portion of grantees can be labeled as pervasively sectarian. This contention, if accurate, would indicate a weakening
stance by the Court than in earlier Establishment Clause cases.
The parochial aid cases in particular address the unconstitutionality of direct federal funding to pervasively sectarian groups, regardless of whether the grantees were significant 0 in number or
10 5
not.
Despite the apparant similarities, the Court distinguished the
parochial aid cases from the A.F.L.A. funding to religious organizations. The Court pointed out that in the parochial aid cases, such
as in Grand Rapids, the Court faced a program that apportioned
federal funds "almost entirely to parochial schools."'0 6 Instead of
identifying the plight of the A.F.L.A. with that of the parochial aid
cases, the Court found the funding provided under the A.F.L.A. to
be that of similar government funding programs upheld in Roemer
v. Maryland Board of Public Works,'0 7 and Tilton v.
08
Richardson.'
In Roemer, the Court upheld a Maryland statute that authorized the appropriation of state funds to any college in the state
that met certain mandatory requirements.'0 9 Using the Lemon test,
the Court found such colleges were not pervasively sectarian in nature notwithstanding their direct relationship to the Roman Catholic church." 0 Ironically, the Maryland statute upheld in Roemer
had an express statutory restriction against sectarian use. There is
no such express statutory preclusion in the text of the A.F.L.A.
Nevertheless the Supreme Court sees the two cases as being so
similar that these types of government subsidies will not be considered as direct federal funding to pervasively sectarian institutions
to such an extent that the funding violates the Establishment
103. See Bowen, 108 S.Ct. at 2575.
104. Id.
105. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743.
106. See Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385. There the Court found that forty
out of forty-one schools receiving the aid were pervasively sectarian.
107. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
108. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
109. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 740.
110. Id. at 758.
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Clause.
In Tilton,"" four church affiliated universities in Connecticut
had been appropriated federal subsidies for construction
projects." 2 Again the Court refused to find that the appropriation
of federal funds to religious colleges was an unconstitutional appropriation of government aid to pervasively sectarian groups. The
Court instead held that the college grantees had adhered to the
statutory restrictions against using the federal monies for promoting religion. 3 Statutory compliance of the college prevented the
Act from having either the purpose or effect of advancing religion.
Again, however, the Supreme Court in Tilton faced a statute that
contained an express statutory restriction against the use of the
government funds for religious purposes.
Refusing to find, on the face of the A.F.L.A. a great risk that
a significant number of grantees receiving the funds were pervasively sectarian, the Bowen Court noted that it was possible that
only a small number of eligible grantees receiving government aid
under the A.F.L.A. may be pervasively sectarian. 1 This position
supports the idea that the first amendment is not violated per se
anytime there is a small possibility that federal funds may be
placed directly in the hands of pervasively sectarian organizations.
Since the A.F.L.A. neutral grantee requirements enable the availability of a wide array of both public and private organizations, the
risk of pervasively sectarian groups receiving funds is diminished
greatly.11 ' Furthermore, if any such organizations were to receive
subsidies, their number and role in comparison to all eligible nonsectarian groups indicates that only a small percentage of eligible
grantees would be considered as significantly sectarian in origin
and purpose. 1"
The Court was also not persuaded by the "symbolic link" illustration. That argument is an attempt to prove the A.F.L.A. constitutionally defective from the mere fact that the Act disbursed
funds to religious groups. In Grand Rapids, the Court found an
impermissible link or union of church and state in a Shared Time
Curriculum program which appropriated state provided public
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672.
Id.
Id.
See Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2575.
Id.
Id.
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teaching in religious school buildings. 117 Unwilling to expand the
Grand Rapids rationale to cover the A.F.L.A.'s fate, the Court determined that if any such "link" did exist, it was too insignificant
to warrant a finding of impermissibly aiding religion."
Finally the Court struck down the argument that the A.F.L.A.
has the unconstitutional effect of advancing religion because it did
not contain a statement that the appropriated funds to eligible
grantees could not be used for religious purposes. Several inconsistencies arise in the Court's analysis at this point. In earlier cases,"'
the Court upheld statutes that sent funds directly to religious
groups when those statutes contained an express statutory restriction against the use of those funds for the promotion of religion.
Yet, in this case, the Court, notwithstanding the earlier decisions,
nonetheless upheld the A.F.L.A. without the type express statutory
preclusion stressed in the Roemer and Tilton cases. In support of
its reasoning, the Court concluded that the Secretary of Health
and Human Services had adequate supervisory powers under the
A.F.L.A.'s provisions 12 0 and that sufficient safeguards existed to insure federal funds would not be unconstitutionally appropriated
for the promotion of religion. The Court pointed out that § 300z5(b)(1) of the Act requires "each grantee which receives funds for a
demonstration project for services . . . shall expend at least one
per centum but not in excess of five per centum of the amounts
received under this subchapter for the conduct of evaluations of
the services supported under this subchapter." This provision further states that the "[s]ecretary may not waive the requirement
that such evaluations be conducted.' 2' The Court also stressed
the text of the Act requires each grantee of federal funds to submit
reports to the Secretary concerning the use of those funds. 2 '
117. Id. at 374. The Court in discussing the "symbolic link" illustration cited
Grand Rapids School District, 437 U.S. at 373, 390. The Court rejected the argument that anytime a government program funds religious groups in an area where
the government and religious organizations share an interest, the relationship
creaks an impermissible "link" between church and state.
118. See Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2576.
119. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736 and Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672.
120. See Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2577.
121. § 300z-5(b)(1).
122. § 300z-5(c) states, "[e]ach grantee which receives funds for a demonstration project for services under this subchapter shall make such reports concerning
its use of federal funds as the Secretary may require. Reports shall include, at
such times as are considered appropriate by the Secretary, the results of the evaluations of the services supported under this subchapter."
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However, the Court's reliance on the Secretary of Health and
Human Services "police power" over the grantees would seem to
present an excessive entanglement problem. The Secretary must, it
would seem, maintain a perpetual surveillance to insure grantees
appropriately spend the federal subsidy. Thus, in voicing a theory
in support of the statute, even without the statutory restriction,
the Court paved the way for an excessive entanglement problem in
the Act's application.
In applying the third prong of the Lemon test the Bowen
Court admitted that the surveillance by the Secretary was imperative, yet it did not hold that such monitoring was to such an extent
as to amount to an "excessive entanglement" between church and
state.1 2 Previous cases were held to promote excessive entanglement between government and religion because the institutions
and organizations receiving the aid were "pervasively sectarian" in
nature.'" Again, however, the Court drew upon its distinction between A.F.L.A. and the parochial school cases and stated, " . . .
there was no reason to assume that the religious organizations
which may receive grants are pervasively sectarian in the same
sense as the Court has held parochial schools to be."' 2 5 The type
and amount of government supervision that the Act calls for on its
face is not to such an extent and magnitude as to constitute the
type of excessive entanglement the Court has held to be present in
other cases.
The distinction between the monitoring called for under the
A.F.L.A. and the parochial school cases may prove to be a distinction without a difference. The crucial question left unanswered is
whether this distinction is sufficient to alleviate the apprehension
of those who fear that the door is again being left open for federal
aid in the parochial school aid context and other similar instances.
The Court's decision seeks to calm these fears by pointing out that
no evidence exists, at least on the face of the statute, that federal
funds are being given directly to pervasively sectarian organizations. However, this distinction, founded upon an analysis concerning the "face" of the Act only, may not withstand problems of excessive entanglement that will arise in application of this Act.
123. See Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2578.
124. The Court in Aguillar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), found excessive
entanglement because the private schools receiving the aid had as a "substantial
purpose" the inculcation of religious values.
125. See Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2578.
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Notwithstanding the Court's finding that the A.F.L.A. on its
face is constitutional, the case has been remanded back to the district court for a determination of whether the A.F.L.A., "as applied," is in violation of the Establishment Clause. Thus, the
Court's holding that the Act on its face did not work to the advantage of pervasively sectarian groups leaves open the question of
whether the Act has the effect of aiding religion in its application. 126 On remand, the Supreme Court has asked for the district
court to address two questions: first, whether in applying the Act,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services has allowed aid given
under the A.F.L.A. to be given to grantees who are pervasively sectarian in nature; and second, whether the Secretary has allowed
to inculfederal funds to be spent on materials that are1' 2"designed
7
faith?'
religious
particular
a
of
views
cate the
CONCLUSION

What does the Bowen case stand for in the realm of Establishment Clause jurisprudence? Several observations may be drawn
from the Court's opinion despite the fact the case has been
remanded.
First, it seems clear that it is possible for legislation to be
drawn that allows direct funding to religious groups, at least when
the face of the statute does not show that a significant number of
grantees are pervasively sectarian in nature. Second, the Court appears unwilling to find legislation unconstitutional simply because
the Act does not expressly preclude the use of federal funds for
religious purposes. Third, more than just a showing that the objectives of the Act and religious values coincide is required before the
Court will find that an act breeds excessive entanglement or advocates the cause of any religion. This conclusion substantiates the
notion that the Court will not equate moral objectives of the law
with the unconstitutional promotion of religion.
Finally, the opinion leaves several unanswered questions. It remains to be seen whether the "as applied" and "on the face" distinction concerning the Act's constitutionality will hold up to the
scrutiny of the district court on remand. The district court's upcoming opinion may show that the A.F.L.A. is unconstitutional "as
applied," notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding that the
Act is constitutional "on the face." The district court may reach
126. Id. 108 S. Ct. at 2580.
127. Id.
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this result due to the impossibility of precluding religious grantees
who are pervasively sectarian in nature from using the funds to
promote religion. This impossibility may cause the courts to reach
the conclusion that in application the Act will breed "excessive entanglement" due to the significant amount of government monitoring that will be needed to insure the Act is secularly applied. Perhaps the opinion presents a new era in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. An era that both opens the door of government accommodation towards religion and an era that endorses the belief
that good government champions the incorporation of moral and
religious principles in secular legislation. What appears to be definite, from the current Supreme Court, is a lack of opposition towards religion and a reaffirmation of the positive role religious
groups can play in governing the people of this country.
Thomas Gray Walker

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/4

20

